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Courts across the United States are grappling with a developing legal
issue that can leave schools, hospitals, and businesses vulnerable to legal
liability: under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), must an
establishment’s website be accessible to blind or visually impaired consum-
ers? Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations.1 The issue involves
whether courts should consider websites as places of public accommodation
and apply this rule to them. The ADA, as it currently exists, makes no men-
tion of the Internet.2 For visually impaired consumers, screen reader technol-
ogy assists them in navigating a website.3 However, for it to work, a website
owner must first intentionally design the site to be compatible with such
technology.4
Currently, federal appellate courts are split on how to apply Title III of
the ADA and whether it should apply to websites.5 The unpredictable results
have only been further complicated by a series of delays by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) in providing guidance regarding the application of Title III
of the ADA.6 In the past year, plaintiffs filed at least 814 federal lawsuits
regarding allegations of inaccessible websites, including a number of devel-
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1. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2008).
2. Vivian Wang, College Websites Must Accommodate Disabled Students, Law-
suits Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/
nyregion/college-websites-disabled.html.
3. See id.
4. See AFB Accessibility Resources, AM. FOUND. FOR THE BLIND, http://www.afb
.org/info/programs-and-services/afb-consulting-services/afb-accessibility-re-
sources/123 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
5. Chris Bruce, Banks Join Legal Fight Over Website Access for Visually Im-
paired, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/banks-join-le-
gal-n73014471896.
6. Amanda Robert, Attorneys: DOJ’s Years-Long Delay On Regulations Hurting
Companies Facing Disabilities Lawsuits Over Their Websites, LEGAL NEW-
SLINE (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:47 AM), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510698224-
attorneys-doj-s-years-long-delay-on-regulations-hurting-companies-facing-dis-
abilities-lawsuits-over-their-websites.
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oping class actions.7 While the DOJ under the Obama administration sup-
ported the move toward website ADA compliance and was expected to
develop rules, under the Trump administration, the DOJ has sent mixed
messages regarding any proposed rule-making, leaving retailers and other
businesses with any online presence to decipher the patchwork of decisions
that has emerged in recent years.8
One particular case best represents an issue pitting accessibility advo-
cates against pro-business groups that warn new ADA requirements will be
far too burdensome.9 Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. is the first case to go to
trial and result in a ruling that the website of a brick-and-mortar business
violated the ADA because it was inaccessible to visually impaired plain-
tiffs.10 The defendant, a regional grocer in the southeastern United States, has
appealed.11 This case is particularly important, as pundits see it as a strong
candidate for consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court.12 As the singular
case to actually proceed to a trial and result in a ruling against a business on
ADA grounds, Gil v. Winn-Dixie is the only case of its kind with an eviden-
tiary and procedural record.13 The Supreme Court will likely want to settle
the ongoing circuit split, and the Court tends to prefer cases with a well-
developed record, such as Gil v. Winn-Dixie.14 The outcome of this decision
will likely embolden other prospective plaintiffs to file website accessibility
cases against entities of all sizes, seeking to use the pressure of recent cases
to force a favorable settlement.15
Further, experts indicate more of these cases are anticipated.16 A 2017
study identified that 81 cases had been filed against an assortment of large
7. Mihn N. Vu & Susan Ryan, 2017 Website Accessibility Lawsuit Recap: A
Tough Year for Businesses, SEYFARTH SHAW (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.ada-
titleiii.com/2018/01/2017-website-accessibility-lawsuit-recap-a-tough-year-for-
businesses.
8. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Notice of Withdrawal of Four
Previously Announced Rulemaking Actions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/121/2017/12/ada-rule-
withdrawal.pdf.
9. Bruce, supra note 5.
10. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2017);
Alexis Kramer, Winn-Dixie Website Runs Afoul of Disability Law, BLOOMBERG
L. (June 15, 2017), https://www.bna.com/winndixie-website-runs-n730144536
06.
11. Bruce, supra note 5.
12. Bruce, supra note 5.
13. See Bruce, supra note 5.
14. See Bruce, supra note 5.
15. Kramer, supra note 10.
16. See Kramer, supra note 10.
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companies ranging from The Cheesecake Factory to Costco Wholesale Cor-
poration for the very same issue—failing to make their websites accessible to
visually impaired consumers.17 The issue has formed an alliance of busi-
nesses, ranging from convenience stores to hotels, filing amicus briefs on
behalf of defendants facing ADA claims.18 Business owners fear the Gil v.
Winn-Dixie ruling makes clear that all of their services—including web-
sites—must be accessible under the ADA.19 Entities such as retail stores,
hotels, and restaurants typically possess a significant web presence and can
find themselves particularly vulnerable to website accessibility lawsuits.
However, this problem extends beyond traditional businesses; entities cov-
ered under the ADA include a broad array of establishments, such as schools,
libraries, day cares, and food banks.20
This Comment argues that the current state of the ADA and how it is
applied to websites under Title III is untenable for those on both sides of the
debate. Attorneys must be able to advise their clients in ensuring compliance
with website accessibility laws and cannot wait for the promulgation of new
regulations. More importantly, the application of the ADA as it exists results
in inconsistencies and major gaps in protection for individuals with disabili-
ties. In its current state, the ADA may end up harming more than helping.
Part II of this comment will examine the background of the ADA, existing
regulatory guidance on website accessibility, and any standards used to deter-
mine such accessibility. Part III will provide a survey of notable case law and
provide a current overview of how courts interpret the ADA in regards to
websites. Part IV will analyze the reasoning within the decision of Gil v.
Winn-Dixie. Finally, Part V will address the competing social, legal, and eco-
nomic considerations involved in this controversy and consider the viability
of potential alternatives.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
A. Overview of the ADA
Understanding the current state of judicial interpretation regarding Title
III and websites requires an overview of the statute’s intended purpose and
functions. The ADA was passed as an expansion of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.21 Congress enacted the ADA with the purpose of establishing “a clear
and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disa-
17. Kramer, supra note 10.
18. See Bruce, supra note 5.
19. See Bruce, supra note 5.
20. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12181(7) (2018).
21. Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2016), with 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). (The
Rehabilitation Act provides protection from disability discrimination in Federal
programs, while the ADA expands this to include protection from disability
discrimination in any public accommodation).
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bility in the areas of employment in the private sector, public accommoda-
tions, public services, transportation, and telecommunications.”22 While the
Rehabilitation Act placed emphasis on services to those with the most severe
disabilities, the ADA was written with the much broader intent of preventing
discrimination against any individuals with a recognized disability.23
Title III provides that “no individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation.”24 In essence, Title III prevents discrimination against dis-
abled individuals by private entities that affect commerce and hold them-
selves out as places of public accommodation.25 The language of the statute
does not define the word “place,” so whether it is limited to a physical envi-
ronment is hotly contested.26 However, the term “public accommodation” is
defined.27 The statute lists which types of private entities affecting commerce
qualify as Title III places of public accommodation in twelve enumerated
categories that are summarized below:
(1) places of lodging, such as an inn, hotel, or motel;
(2) establishments serving food or drink, such as a restaurant or bar;
(3) place of exhibition or entertainment, such as a movie theater, con-
cert hall, or stadium;
(4) place of public gathering, such as an auditorium, convention
center, or lecture hall;
(5) sales or rental establishments, like a bakery, clothing store, or
shopping center;
(6) service establishments, such as laundromats, banks, barber shops,
and pharmacies;
(7) stations for specified public transportation, terminals, and depots;
(8) places of public display or collection, such as a museum, library,
or gallery;
22. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 28 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
310.
23. The Act consists of multiple “Titles” which delineate the restriction of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities in various categories. For example,
Title I covers discrimination with regards to employment, Title II addresses
public services, and Title III covers public accommodations and services oper-
ated by private entities. See An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, https://adata.org/factsheet/ADA-overview (last
updated 2017).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
25. See id. § 12181(7).
26. See J.H. ex rel. Holman v. Just for Kids, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1215–17
(D. Utah 2017) (discussing and contrasting different circuit courts’ definitions
of “place” under the ADA).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
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(9) places of recreation, such as traditional parks, zoos, and amuse-
ment parks;
(10) places of education of all levels (elementary, secondary, under-
graduate, or postgraduate);
(11) social service center establishments, such as a day cares, shelters,
and food banks;
(12) places of exercise or recreation, like gyms, spas, bowling alleys,
and golf courses.28
Guidance from the Department of Justice indicates the categories listed
in Title III are an exhaustive list of categories, but the examples given within
each category are not exhaustive.29 The ADA further requires public accom-
modations “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with dis-
abilities.”30 But modifications deemed reasonable can vary broadly between
industries.31 To this end, entities must “take such steps as may be necessary
to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services,
segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of
the absence of auxiliary aids and services . . .”32 Failure to do so triggers a
cause of action for an affected party that is intended to be protected by the
statute.33
Under the ADA, a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to punitive dam-
ages but can recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.34 Injunctive relief
is available if the discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural
barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in nature, in existing
facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.”35 In other words, the
ADA requires, without exception, that any policies or practices of a public
accommodation be reasonably modified to provide access to disabled indi-
viduals unless doing so would fundamentally alter what is offered.36 Enforc-
ing compliance via injunctive relief would require an individualized inquiry
28. See id.
29. See ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www
.ada.gov/taman3.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
31. ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 29.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
33. See id. § 12188 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-243 (excluding Pub. L. No.
115-232)) (discussing enforcement provisions for disabled individuals who
face discrimination).
34. Id. §§ 12188(b), 12205, 2000a–3(b).
35. Id. §§ 12188(a)(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
36. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person’s disabil-
ity would be reasonable under the circumstances.37
B. Department of Justice Guidance
The DOJ regularly issues guidance to various entities that may be liable
under existing statutes, such as the ADA. While Section 12181(7) of the
ADA lists the broad categories of unlawful discrimination under Title III, it
does not define compliance or specific conduct.38 For example, when it
comes to specific standards for website compliance under Title III of the
ADA, no details on how to comply with the law are provided. Title III in-
stead leaves the DOJ to issue implementing regulations to establish accessi-
bility standards and put covered entities on notice of their specific obligations
under the law.39 In 2010, the DOJ issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, warning that it was “considering revising the regulations imple-
menting Title III of the ADA in order to establish requirements for making
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, accommodations, or advantages of-
fered by public accommodations via the Internet, specifically at sites on the
World Wide Web (Web) accessible to individuals with disabilities.”40 The
advance notice indicated the DOJ’s objective to clarify any “remaining un-
certainty regarding the applicability of the ADA to Web sites of entities cov-
ered by Title III” and “make clear to entities covered by the ADA their
obligations to make their Web sites accessible.”41
While this announcement provided a welcome indication of the DOJ’s
acknowledgement of the problem and plan to issue clarifying rules, an ad-
vanced notice of proposed rulemaking is an early part of a long rulemaking
process.42 In the meantime, entities are forced to wait for the issuance of
actual rules detailing how to comply with the law. On the other hand, the
DOJ’s advance notice expressed the view that companies did not necessarily
need to make their websites accessible as long as they offered an alternative
way for individuals with disabilities to access its good or services, such as a
37. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001).
38. See 42 U.S.C § 12181(7).
39. See id. § 12186(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.101 (2016) (describing purpose of
DOJ’s regulations).
40. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommoda-
tions, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (proposed July 26, 2010).
41. Id.
42. See IRM § 32.1.1.2.1.
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24-hour phone line.43 However, even this suggestion is not an officially pre-
scribed rule that would ensure an entity was in compliance with the ADA.
When Gil v. Winn-Dixie was first filed, the DOJ filed a Statement of
Interest supporting the plaintiff and argued that “‘Title III applies to discrim-
ination in the goods and services “of” a place of public accommodation,
rather than being limited to those goods and services provided “at” or “in” a
place of public accommodation.’”44 At the time, Winn-Dixie objected to the
DOJ’s involvement and moved to strike the Statement of Interest.45 By this
point, the DOJ had already begun increasing its investigations regarding
website compliance with the ADA for school districts and education institu-
tions.46 Critics even charged that the DOJ’s prior activity was encouraging
more lawsuits charging non-compliance with the ADA while businesses
awaited further guidance from the DOJ.47 Businesses left waiting on updated
DOJ final regulations could be caught off guard by demand letters or law-
suits alleging their websites are not in compliance with the ADA. If the DOJ
were to create new rules, the next step would be to issue a regular Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.48 However, despite issuing the notice of proposed
rulemaking and collecting public comments, the DOJ under the Obama ad-
ministration never took the next step in enacting an official regulation ad-
dressing website accessibility.
In the waning months of the Obama administration, the DOJ indicated
that no Notice of Advanced Rulemaking on ADA website accessibility
would be published until 2018.49 Then, under the Trump administration, the
DOJ placed the original 2010 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
its list of “inactive” regulations.50 Placing a notice of proposed rulemaking on
its “inactive” list signals the issue is not a priority for the current administra-
43. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommoda-
tions, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (proposed July 26, 2010).
44. Mihn N. Vu, Florida Courts Rule ADA Covers Websites with Nexus to Physical
Store, SEYFARTH SHAW (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2017/04/
florida-courts-rule-ada-covers-websites-with-nexus-to-physical-store/.
45. Id.
46. See Andy Jones, Department of Education Increases Investigations into Web-
site Compliance with the ADA, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 25, 2016), https://
legalnewsline.com/stories/510738182-department-of-education-increases-in-
vestigations-into-website-compliance-with-ada.
47. See Robert, supra note 6.
48. See A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFF. OF THE FED. REG., https://www
.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2019).
49. Robert, supra note 6.
50. 2017 Inactive Regulations, REGINFOGOV, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/
eAgenda/InactiveRINs_2017_Agenda_Update.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
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tion.51 By December 2017, the DOJ announced it had withdrawn the pro-
posed rulemaking entirely.52 The DOJ stated it would evaluate “whether
specific technical standards are necessary and appropriate to assist covered
entities with complying with the ADA.”53
This withdrawal signals that the DOJ intends to take no action towards
expanding the coverage of Title III, but it leaves retailers and other busi-
nesses with an online presence without guidance or standards while the num-
ber of website accessibility lawsuits continues to rise. While it is
unsurprising that a new administration does not have an interest in carrying
forward the plans and priorities of a previous administration of another politi-
cal party, this announcement leaves any entities that may be liable under the
ADA to fend for themselves. The only existing guidance for business is the
patchwork of holdings issued by various courts across different jurisdictions,
each with unique standards a defendant must meet to comply with the law.
C. The WCAG 2.0
Currently, no standards have ever been proposed by the DOJ or Con-
gress that prescribe any levels of accessibility for websites, but a popular
standard for plaintiffs is the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG)
2.0—a set of recommended international standards that outline how websites
can be more accessible for people with disabilities and was established by a
consortium of private organizations whose goal was to increase website ac-
cessibility.54 This is the framework the district court recommended in Winn-
Dixie, based on the testimony of an expert witness who tested Winn-Dixie’s
website functionality.55 The initial version of WCAG (WCAG 1.0) provided
a reference for accessibility principles.56 The current version, WCAG 2.0,
was finalized in 2008 and adopted as an international organizations standard
51. Jarret Cummings, ADA Web Accessibility Regulatory Process Now “Inactive”,
EDUCAUSE REVIEW (July 27, 2017), https://er.educause.edu/blogs/2017/7/ada-
web-accessibility-regulatory-processes-now-inactive.
52. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Notice of Withdrawal of Four
Previously Announced Rulemaking Actions, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www
.adatitleiii.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/121/2017/12/ada-rule-withdrawal.pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
53. Id. at 3.
54. See About W3C, W3C, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2019); see also ADA Website Accessibility and the New WCAG 2.1 Standards,
GRAYROBINSON, http://www.gray-robinson.com/article/post/1754/ada-website-
accessibility-and-the-new-wcag-21-standards (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
55. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
56. Navigating WCAG 1.0 Guidelines and Techniques Documents, W3C WEB AC-
CESSIBILITY INITIATIVE, https://www.w3.org/WAI/intro/wcag10.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2019).
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in 2012.57 In an update of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act finalized in
January 2017, the federal government’s Access Board “virtually adopted” the
WCAG guidelines.58 Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act requires federal
agencies to make their electronic information accessible to people with disa-
bilities, so any guidance provided for compliance with the Rehabilitation Act
does not carry much weight against ADA claims.59
The WCAG 2.0 is divided into three different levels of conformance: A,
AA, and AAA.60 Each of the three levels of “success criteria” indicate a
different level of accessibility and design feasibility (with AAA being the
most accessible, but least feasible).61 However, even these conformance
levels have been criticized as vague or subject to different interpretations, as
seen in the DOJ’s notice of advanced rulemaking, where the DOJ stated the
difference between the various conformance levels could cause confusion but
never indicated a standard that would be ADA compliant.62 Even the court
that ruled in Gil v. Winn-Dixie did not indicate which level of success criteria
would be sufficient to carry out the injunctive order and comply with Title
III.63
III. THE CONFUSING CASELAW OF WEBSITE
ACCESSIBILITY CLAIMS
Conflicting interpretations, unclear guidance, and the unpredictable le-
gal landscape has only encouraged further litigation. While the legislative
record indicates Congress intended to revise the ADA in order to adapt to
changing needs,64 congressional inaction and rapid technological develop-
57. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1346.
58. Id.
59. See The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.S § 794(d) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No.
115-243 (excluding Pub. L. No. 115-232)); see also M. Christine Fotopulos,
Civil Rights Across Borders: Extraterritorial Application of Information Tech-
nology Accessibility Requirements Under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act,
36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 95, n. 7 (2006).
60. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, W3C, https://www.w3.org/
TR/WCAG20/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
61. Id.
62. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Infor-
mation and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Ac-
commodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 434460, 43465 (proposed July 26, 2016) (seeking
feedback regarding whether DOJ should adopt WCAG 2.0’s Level AA success
criteria or should consider adopting another success criteria level).
63. See Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1350.
64. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress “intends that the
types of accommodation and services provided to individuals with disabilities,
under . . . this bill, should keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of
the times. This is a period of tremendous change and growth involving technol-
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ments65 have left courts in the unenviable position of applying old law to new
technologies. Because no further regulations or guidance have been issued,
courts must continue to apply the language of the law as it exists, and the
moving target of ADA website compliance continues to shift. When ADA
website discrimination suits first began appearing in courts, judges looked to
a more established area of the law and relied on Title III insurance cases for
guidance.66 Why? Insurance cases represented the closest available approxi-
mation of web discrimination cases because they dealt with similar legal
issues.67
A. Insurance Cases
Causes of action regarding both insurance and website discrimination
under the ADA are derived from the same wording of Title III, which prohib-
its discrimination “in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation.”68 Because of their common statutory origin, insurance
cases and website accessibility claims both require a determination on how
the services a company offers could affect the definition of public accommo-
dation under the statute.69 These kinds of cases, in the insurance context,
usually involve allegations of discriminatory employer-provided insurance
policies.70 Because the insurance policies were provided by an employer (and
not purchased in an insurance office, which would qualify as a place of pub-
lic accommodation), plaintiffs could not raise an ADA claim unless they suc-
cessfully argued that the insurance policy itself qualified as a public
accommodation under the statute.71 At the time, insurance litigation regard-
ing places of public accommodation were decided under one of two major
ogy assistance and the Committee wishes to encourage this process.” H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485, at 108 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 391.
65. In 1997, only eighteen percent of all U.S. households had in-home Internet
access, but by 2012, nearly seventy-five percent of U.S. households had In-
ternet access. Computer & Internet Access in the United States, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/demo/com-
puter-internet/computer-use-2012.html.
66. Carly Schiff, Cracking the Code: Implementing Internet Accessibility Through
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2315, 2317 (2016).
67. See id. at 2323–24.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Whole-
saler’s Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1994); Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1348.
69. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18; Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1348.
70. See, e.g., Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
71. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
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controlling views; but even with only two dominant interpretations, circuit
courts varied greatly in defining a public accommodation.72
The first influential case came from the First Circuit in Carparts Distri-
bution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of New England,
Inc., where the plaintiff alleging discrimination was diagnosed with HIV
prior to his insurance company’s announcement that it would severely limit
benefits for AIDS-related illnesses.73 The court’s interpretation of the plain
meaning of the ADA proved influential, because it indicated that public ac-
commodations were not limited to physical entities.74 The court reasoned the
inclusion of the term “services” in the ADA’s definition of public accommo-
dations signaled that not all public accommodations even need be tangible
locations.75 Further, the court determined an ambiguous construction of pub-
lic accommodations supported public policy and provided the solution Con-
gress intended in ending discrimination against people with disabilities.76
While the First Circuit only initially indicated that a place of public accom-
modation need not be a solely physical structure,77 the Seventh Circuit later
extended the reasoning, concluding even the operator of a website would be
restricted from discriminating against people with disabilities in accessing a
physical or electronic space.78
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit vehemently disagreed with the First
Circuit’s reasoning when confronted with the same question in Parker v.
Metropolitan Life.79 The case involved a plaintiff suffering from a mental
disorder who alleged a violation of the ADA because her employer-offered
insurance plan presented drastically reduced benefits for mental disorders in
comparison to benefits for physical disabilities.80 However, the Sixth Circuit
firmly held a public accommodation required a physical place.81 Addition-
ally, the court ruled that, because the public did not have access to the same
insurance policy, there was no “nexus” between the benefits of the plan con-
stituting an alleged ADA violation and a place of public accommodation.82 In
essence, the insurance policy did not violate the ADA because, in the view of
72. Schiff, supra note 66.
73. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14.
74. See id. at 20.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).
79. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 1011.
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the court, it had no connection to any of the enumerated places of public
accommodation.
The court’s reasoning was based on its own interpretation of the plain
meaning in the ADA using another statutory canon of construction—noscitur
a sociis—which defines the meaning of vague language in a text by relying
on the meanings of its immediately adjacent terms.83 The Sixth Circuit also
looked to the Department of Justice’s treatment of wholesalers under Title
III, which classified wholesalers’ offered services into two categories: (1)
those available to the general public; and (2) those only available to other
businesses (which would be exempt from the public accommodation require-
ment).84 In spite of the majority’s holding in Parker, Chief Judge Martin’s
dissent specifically called to attention that technology could affect the defini-
tion of a public accommodation and predicted that limiting Title III to only
physical places would undermine its protections as technology continued to
expand the way consumers purchase goods or services.85
Following the Sixth Circuit’s example in Parker, the Ninth Circuit em-
ployed similar reasoning in Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. and
ruled that an entity must be a physical facility to qualify as a place of public
accommodation.86 The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the Parker holding later
set the stage for the foundational split in case law that exists today regarding
website discrimination claims under the ADA. Applying the legal reasoning
of these Title III insurance cases, federal district courts have arrived at incon-
sistent holdings on ADA website accessibility claims.
B. ADA Website Accessibility Caselaw
One of the earliest influential cases regarding website ADA compliance
claims was decided by the Eleventh Circuit in Rendon v. Valleycrest Produc-
tions Ltd.87 Rendon provided an interesting set of facts, as individuals with
disabilities brought an ADA Title III claim against the producers of the tele-
vision gameshow “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.”88 The plaintiffs alleged
the telephone screening process the show’s producers used to select potential
contestants (which required rapid button-dialing in response to an audio
question) discriminated against individuals with hearing or mobility disabili-
83. Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
84. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011–12.
85. Id. at 1019–20 (Martin, J., dissenting). “The same technological advances that
have offered disabled individuals unprecedented freedom may now operate to
deprive them of rights that Title III would otherwise guarantee.” Id. at 1020.
86. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114–15 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Parker, 121 F.3d at 1006).
87. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
88. Id. at 1279.
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ties.89 In this case, the court reasoned the “show [took] place at a public
accommodation (a studio)” which fell under the ADA and agreed with the
plaintiffs that the process used to select contestants tended to screen out indi-
viduals with disabilities.90 But the court first looked to the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits’ adoption of Parker and established the need for a “nexus” between
the alleged Title III violation and a place of public accommodation.91 In rul-
ing for the plaintiffs, the court concluded the alleged violation had a suffi-
cient “nexus” to the physical location of the game show because the
screening process served as the sole means obtaining access to the studio
where the game show was filmed.92
Another court relied on the precedent set in Rendon to reach a different
result when it considered Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, in which a plain-
tiff sued the first major airline to establish a presence on the Internet.93 While
Southwest intended for its virtual ticket counter website to operate as a con-
venient feature, the site was largely inaccessible to individuals using screen
reader technology, and a visually impaired plaintiff sued under Title III.94
The court applied Rendon’s “nexus” theory, but concluded that no nexus ex-
isted between the website and a physical place.95 Because the court found
Southwest’s website could not be tied to a specific location and did not con-
sider websites to be physical places of public accommodation, it ruled in
favor of the airline.96 Even though the court acknowledged the website was
inaccessible to individuals with visual disabilities, it noted the incompatible
website did not inhibit such individuals’ ability to access an actual place of
public accommodation (such as a game show studio or, in this case, South-
west’s physical ticket counters).97 Notably, the court sagely warned against
expanding the ADA’s reach to include non-physical spaces because it would
“create new rights without well-defined standards.”98
If previous cases can be seen as attempting to limit the expansion of
Title III, National Federation of the Blind v. Target changed course and
sought to include most websites under its purview.99 In this case, the Califor-
89. Id. at 1280.
90. Id. at 1283.
91. Id. at 1284 n.8.
92. Id. at 1283.
93. Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
94. See id. at 1316.
95. Id. at 1321.
96. See id. at 1320.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1318.
99. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target, Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
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nia branch of the National Federation of the Blind led a multi-plaintiff law-
suit against Target Corporation, claiming that its website was effectively
inaccessible to visually disabled consumers and violated the ADA.100 The
website, Target.com, offered an inventory of goods for purchase similar to
inventory sold in-store and provided additional information such as coupons,
store hours and locations, and store pickup options.101
While defendants sought to invoke nexus theory arguments, the court
rejected the foundational assertion that a public accommodation must be a
physical place and reasoned that even a website could face liability under
Title III of the ADA as a “service” provided by a place of public accommo-
dation.102 The court reinforced its reasoning with a plain language interpreta-
tion of Title III, noting it prohibits discrimination in the provision of the
goods and services “of,” as opposed to “in,” a public accommodation.103 In
other words, the court made clear discrimination under the ADA could occur
anywhere, even away from a place of public accommodation. However, the
court attempted to limit the effects of its holding by only recognizing Title III
website claims based on information or services affecting the enjoyment of
goods from Target brick-and-mortar locations.104
More recently, other courts have been reluctant to include websites with
physical locations under Title III claims. In Young v. Facebook, the plaintiff
alleged Facebook did not accommodate people with mental disorders when it
had terminated her accounts due to repeated violations of Facebook’s State-
ment of Rights and Responsibility.105 The court was bound by Ninth Circuit
precedent and held that only a physical place can be a place of public accom-
modation.106 The court distinguished Facebook’s websites from an actual
physical location (which could classify as a place of public accommodation),
since the information and services it provided existed solely on the In-
ternet.107 Despite the fact the plaintiff traveled to Facebook’s physical head-
quarters in Santa Clara, the court noted that the services provided to the
public via Facebook’s website would not normally be available at its head-
quarters; thus, even the “nexus” test in National Federation of the Blind
would fail to establish liability under the ADA.108
Unsurprisingly, courts continue to differ in interpreting exactly what
type of entities fall under Title III and whether websites should be held to the
100. See id. at 949.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 952.
103. Id. at 953.
104. Id. at 956.
105. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
106. Id. at 1115.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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same compliance standards as physical locations. As a result, several differ-
ent approaches to Title III have formed among U.S. Circuit Courts.
C. Current Judicial Interpretations of ADA Website Liability
Mirroring the split results of the aforementioned cases, two opposing
interpretations rose to prominence in determining website accessibility suits.
One strictly construes places of public accommodation to be physical enti-
ties, while the second school of thought consists of a wider array of interpre-
tations reading the language of Title III more broadly. Following a strict
interpretation of the enumerated places of public accommodations listed in
Title III of the ADA, the Third and Sixth Circuits have declined to apply
Title III to non-physical locations such as websites.109 However, of the courts
that have extended Title III to websites, there tend to be two general divi-
sions: (1) one group of courts employs a liberal construction of Title III that
captures the intent of Congress in enacting ADA; and (2) the other group
relies upon the nexus theory approach.
For example, the First and Seventh Circuits’ approaches broadly con-
strue the language of Title III to “to effectuate its purpose of providing a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities.”110 In other words, these courts take
a more liberal interpretation of Title III in order to better comply with the
intended purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act.111 This approach
tends to consider any services or goods offered to the public by a private
entity, not just those offered at a physical location falling into a Section
12181(7) category.112 The end goal is to ensure goods and services offered to
the public on any platform (like websites) are accessible to all, within the
spirit of the law. Using this analysis, several courts have found even purely
online businesses with no connection to any physical place as a “public ac-
commodation” listed in Section 12181(7) under Title III.113
109. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–14 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“[W]e do not find . . . the terms in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) to refer to non-
physical access or even to be ambiguous . . . .”); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 1006, 1010–13 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “a public accommoda-
tion is a physical place”); Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59
F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (determining that places of public accommoda-
tion are limited to physical “facilities”).
110. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 573 (D. Vt. 2015).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass.
2012) (“[E]xcluding businesses that sell services through the Internet from the
ADA would ‘run afoul of the purposes of the ADA’”) (quoting Carparts Dis-
trib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.
1994)).
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The more tempered approach favored by other courts, including the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, focuses on the “nexus” theory—whether the
alleged non-compliant place or process has a sufficient nexus to a physical
space that is a public accommodation.114 Simply stated, the goods and ser-
vices provided by a public accommodation must have a sufficient connection
or “nexus” to a physical place in order to be liable under the ADA.115 There-
fore, a business’ website violates Title III when it impedes the “full and equal
enjoyment” of the goods and services offered at that business’ physical estab-
lishment to people with disabilities.116 Conversely, if there is no effect on a
disabled person’s access to goods or services at physical location, no ADA
violation exists under this view.117
D. The Netflix Problem
The inconsistent approaches to websites under Title III of the ADA has
led to conflicting results across different jurisdictions. Cullen v. Netflix and
National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix serve as the best example of the
problem as two cases involving the Internet streaming service in two differ-
ent jurisdictions that reached opposing results in the same year.118 In both
cases, plaintiffs argued the streaming site failed to fully subtitle content in its
library and therefore denied equal access to its service to people with hearing
114. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir.
2000) (interpreting Title III “suggest[s] that some connection between the good
or service complained of and an actual physical place is required”); see Rendon
v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (identifying a
nexus between remote technological eligibility process and access to “the privi-
lege of competing in a contest held in a concrete space”).
115. See, e.g., Earll v. Ebay, Inc., 599 Fed. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015).
116. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target, Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 955–56
(N.D. Cal. 2006). (granting standing to plaintiffs that “alleged the inaccessibil-
ity of Target.com denie[d] the blind the ability to enjoy the services of Target
stores”).
117. Jancik v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. SACV-13-1387-DOC (RNBx),
2014 WL 1920751, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (holding a website was not
place of public accommodation because there was not a sufficient nexus be-
tween its website and physical kiosks); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp.
2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Facebook operates only in cyberspace, and is
thus not a place of public accommodation. . . . Although Facebook’s physical
headquarters obviously is a physical space, it is not a place where the online
services are offered to the public”); Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV 10-133-M-
DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at *4–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding
online theater websites were not physical places and not sufficiently connected
to any physical structure).
118. Cullen v. Netflix, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Nat’l Ass’n of the
Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
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disabilities.119 Under the more aggressive liberal construction approach, the
U.S. District Court of Massachusetts was bound by the First Circuit prece-
dent set in Carparts and ruled that Netflix’s website was a place of public
accommodation under Title III.120 However, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, bound by Ninth Circuit precedent set in
Weyer, the court applied the “nexus” approach.121 The court held that Net-
flix’s streaming website was not a place of public accommodation under Ti-
tle III because it was only available via the Internet, not a physical location,
so no nexus existed.122 A series of recent decisions in the past year has only
complicated these unpredictable results.
E. Other Cases
In 2017 alone, businesses with an online presence faced a surge of de-
mand letters and lawsuits regarding the inaccessibility of their websites to the
visually impaired in violation of Title III of the ADA:
• In Andres Gomez v. Bang & Olufsen America, Inc. in February 2017,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss and relied on precedent to con-
clude that websites are wholly unconnected to any physical location
and generally not subject to the ADA.123 The court held “the ADA
does not require places of public accommodations to create full-ser-
vice websites for disabled persons . . . [but] if a retailer chooses to
have a website, [it] cannot impede a disabled person’s full use and
enjoyment of the brick-and-mortar store.”124
• In Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC in March 2017, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California deferred to the DOJ’s
authority when it ruled in favor of Domino’s.125 The plaintiff alleged
that the Domino’s website violated the ADA because it failed to
meet WCAG 2.0 AA guidelines.126 The court dismissed the case for
two reasons: (1) the plaintiff failed to identify an ADA violation,
especially in light of the fact that the Domino’s website included a
119. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199; Cullen, 880 F. Supp. 2d at
1021.
120. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
121. Cullen, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
122. Id.
123. Gomez v. Bang & Olufsen Am., Inc., No. 16-CV-23801, 2017 WL 1957182, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2017).
124. Id. at *1.
125. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. CV-16-06599-SJO-SPX, 2017 WL
1330216, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017).
126. Id.
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banner readable by screen reader software that directed blind users to
a 1-800 number where they could receive assistance from an opera-
tor in navigating the website; and (2) finding the website in violation
of the ADA would violate Domino’s due process rights because the
DOJ had yet to promulgate new regulations on website
accessibility.127
• In Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., concluded in June 2017, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied
Hobby Lobby’s motion to dismiss and went a step further in holding
the retailer’s website constituted a “public accommodation” under
the ADA.128 In justifying its holding, the court noted the website
allowed consumers to accomplish a wide variety of activities, such
as purchasing products, searching store locations, viewing discounts,
obtaining coupons, and purchasing gift cards.129 Finally, the court
relied on other existing regulations issued by the DOJ requiring pub-
lic accommodations “communicate effectively” with customers with
disabilities through the use of auxiliary aids and services.130
• In October 2017, one of the first cases involving the application of
the ADA to mobile apps emerged.131 In Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California rejected
CVS’s motion to dismiss the suit and its argument that the court
could not make a determination because there are no legally binding
standards for website and mobile accessibility.132 The court ex-
plained the lawsuit simply asked the court to make the same accessi-
bility determination it would regularly make regarding the
accessibility of physical locations.133 This ruling will likely pave the
way for further suits and settlements regarding mobile apps.
• In November 2017, a New Hampshire federal court ruled the ADA
applied to a business’ website in Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron,
LLC.134 The court denied the online food delivery company’s motion
to dismiss and held that Blue Apron’s website was a place of public
127. Id. at *5.
128. Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. CV 17-1131-JFW(SKX), 2017 WL
2957736, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017).
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id. at *3.
131. See Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 17-3877-MWF (SKX), 2017 WL
4457508, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017).
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id. at *6.
134. Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-CV-116-JL, 2017 WL 5186354,
at *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017).
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accommodation, in spite of the fact Blue Apron operates exclusively
online and has no traditional physical locations for customers to
visit.135
This brief list does not include the vast majority of cases that were set-
tled out of court. Among the most notable, McDonald’s, Kmart, Grubhub,
and home supply company Empire Today recently settled cases alleging their
websites or smartphone applications were not accessible to visually impaired
customers.136 Settlement is often preferred by defendants for several reasons.
First, it keeps the determination out of the hands of a judge, which could lead
to potentially unpredictable results; a court could determine standards arbi-
trarily or base their reasoning on misused expert testimony. Settlement also
allows defendants to offer solutions that work best for its business, as op-
posed to following whatever remedial steps a judge orders, which can vary
wildly. While ADA claims are only remedial and can only provide compen-
sation for a plaintiff’s legal fees, settlements often remain confidential, so the
true “cost” of settling is difficult to gauge.137
Further, and most importantly, in June 2017, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida issued its opinion on Gil v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc.138 The district court ruled in favor of Gil, holding that the grocery
chain denied full and equal access to goods and services of a place of public
accommodation.139 The court ordered Winn-Dixie to make its website acces-
sible to customers who rely on special software to use websites.140 At the
time, the company’s Vice President of Corporate and Consumer Affairs an-
nounced that Winn-Dixie planned to appeal the judgement, stating that while
the company is “sensitive to the needs of the visually impaired . . . the legal
position regarding website standards are unclear and [it] believe[s] improve-
ment can be achieved through customer dialogue, rather than through the
courts.”141
135. Id.
136. Samantha Bomkamp, McDonald’s, Kmart, Others Settle Suits Over Website




138. Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
139. Id. at 1349.
140. Id. at 1351.
141. Kramer, supra note 10.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF GIL V. WINN-DIXIE, INC.
The dispute in Gil v. Winn-Dixie centered on the ADA lawsuit by Juan
Carlos Gil, a legally blind customer of Winn-Dixie Stores Inc.142 Following a
bench trial, the court ruled Winn-Dixie’s website violated the ADA.143 This
case and the resulting verdict are notable for several reasons. As previously
mentioned, Gil is the first case of its kind to go to trial and result in a ruling
against a physical business for violating Title III of the ADA by having an
inaccessible website.144 The limited damages available under the ADA and
relatively limited attorneys’ fees resulting from these cases usually destine
them to be settled early-on in litigation. In contrast to other cases that were
either settled or decided upon pre-trial motions, this case proceeded to trial
on a fact-intensive analysis of the website’s inaccessibility with common
screen reader software and was fielded by expert testimony.145 Because of the
trial and expert witness testimony, the court even ordered Winn-Dixie to
comply with the very WCAG 2.0 guidelines the plaintiff suggested.146
As a district court decision, this ruling is not binding on other federal
courts, but it does lay groundwork for other courts to replicate if an ADA
website compliance case were to proceed to trial. This decision is also signif-
icant because any ruling in favor of a plaintiff can serve to embolden further
plaintiffs to bring more ADA website accessibility lawsuits. Winn-Dixie ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and filed its
opening brief in October of 2017.147 Finding themselves in danger of facing
liability under the ADA for their website compliance, multiple trade groups
across a dozen industries argued that the current caselaw has created “signifi-
cant confusion” about the ADA and what is required to comply.148 Unfortu-
nately, the facts of Gil v. Winn-Dixie do not help to shed more light on those
requirements.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Gil brought the action under Title III of the ADA, alleging the
defendant’s website was inaccessible to the visually impaired.149 The suit
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and
costs.150 The parties did not dispute that Gil had a qualified disability and that
142. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1340.
143. Id. at 1349.
144. Id. at 1350.
145. Id. at 1346.
146. Id. at 1351.
147. Bruce, supra note 5.
148. Bruce, supra note 5.
149. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1340.
150. Id.
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Winn-Dixie’s physical grocery stores and pharmacies were considered public
accommodations under Title III.151 Plaintiff Gil, who is legally blind and has
cerebral palsy, is able to use a computer but cannot see the screen.152 He uses
access technology software with a screen reader which automatically tells Gil
what is on the website.153
Gil alleged he had shopped at Winn-Dixie’s stores and pharmacies for
years and had a member rewards card.154 When Gil discovered the ability to
access coupons and refill prescriptions online, Gil found that some 90% of
the website did not work with his reading software.155 The complaint offered
over 500 other sites Gil used that were accessible, including other grocery
store chains, such as Publix and Walgreens.156 In order to receive remedy
under the ADA, Gil noted he was “100% certain” he would return to Winn-
Dixie stores once the website is accessible.157
In its response, Winn-Dixie admitted it was in the process of creating an
ADA policy for its site, but that it had faced many obstacles.158 First, Winn-
Dixie claimed six different third parties, including Google and American Ex-
press, were needed to coordinate in modifying the interface of its own Winn-
Dixie site to be ADA-compliant.159 Second, Winn-Dixie claimed there were
multiple screen readers and browser formats that needed to be accommo-
dated, which caused complications. However, Gil’s expert provided the most
influential testimony for the court. The expert tested the website and sug-
gested that the WCAG addressed all of the primary issues or problems found
on the Winn-Dixie website.160 He estimated it would cost much less than the
$250,000 the company reserved to fix the site ($37,000 or less).161
For the district court, the most important facts regarding Winn-Dixie’s
website accessibility revolved around its pharmacy and coupons.162 Winn-
Dixie’s website allowed customers to refill prescriptions online without or-
dering at the pharmacy, but the website was incompatible with screen-read-
ers.163 Gil alleged he did not wish to go into the pharmacy because he would
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1343.
153. Id.
154. Id.




159. Id. at 1345.
160. Id.
161. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1347.
162. Id. at 1349.
163. Id. at 1344.
280 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXI
have to verbally inform the pharmacist what he needed and felt uncomforta-
ble because he could not know if other people are nearby, listening.164 Gil
alleged he was filing to protect his privacy under HIPPA (Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996—a data privacy law on the safe-
guarding of medical information) so that he did not have to verbally an-
nounce what medications he required at the pharmacy.165
As for the coupons, Gil’s only way of reading coupons without website
access would be to have a friend or store employee read the printed adver-
tisements at the store.166 An important distinction to draw is that Winn-Dixie
does not conduct any sales directly from its website. However, the website
does allow customers to access digital coupons which “link” to the cus-
tomer’s Winn-Dixie card, so it applies the discount upon purchase.167 The
only way to have a digital coupon link to a customer’s reward card is through
the Winn-Dixie website.168
B. Holding & Rationale
In its analysis, the court acknowledged the existing split between courts
on whether the ADA limits places of public accommodation to only physical
spaces.169 The court also acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit had not ad-
dressed whether websites are public accommodations under the ADA.170 In-
stead, the next best thing was the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Rendon,
which ruled that the plain language of Title III of the ADA covers both phys-
ical barriers that prevent a disabled person from accessing a public accom-
modation as well as “intangible barriers, such as eligibility requirements and
screening rules or discriminatory policies and procedures that restrict a dis-
abled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services and
privileges.”171 Under the belief that intangible barriers could be covered
under Title III, the district court relied on cases applying the “nexus” ap-
proach. Those courts concluded that while places of public accommodation
must be physical spaces, the goods and services provided by a public accom-





167. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1345.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1348.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir.
2002)).
172. See Earll v. Ebay, Inc., 599 Fed. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (the term
“place of public accommodation” requires a connection between the good or
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Upon this foundation, the court developed its own legal reasoning based
on the “nexus” test and considered how heavily “integrated” a website was
into physical locations themselves. The Court recognized that where a web-
site was “heavily integrated with brick-and-mortar stores and operates as a
gateway to the physical store locations,” courts have found it to be a service
of a public accommodation and therefore covered by the ADA.173 Under this
logic, the court reasoned the services offered on Winn-Dixie’s website (such
as the online pharmacy system, digital coupons, and the ability to find store
locations) are “undoubtedly services, privileges, advantages, and accommo-
dations offered by Winn-Dixie’s physical store locations.”174 The court found
these accommodations especially important for visually impaired individuals
because “it is difficult, if not impossible, for such individuals to use paper
coupons found in newspapers or in the grocery stores, to locate the physical
stores by other means, and to physically go to a pharmacy location in order to
fill prescriptions.”175
The court concluded that Winn-Dixie’s website was inaccessible to
visually impaired individuals who must use screen reader software, and
therefore, Winn-Dixie had violated the ADA because the inaccessibility of its
website “denied Gil the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations that Winn-Dixie offers to
its sighted customers.”176 However, the court noted it need not decide
whether Winn-Dixie’s website is a public accommodation itself, because the
factual findings demonstrated the website was “heavily integrated” with
Winn-Dixie’s physical store locations and “operates as a gateway” to the
physical store locations.177
The court found injunctive relief appropriate because Winn-Dixie
presented no evidence it would be unduly burdensome to make its website
accessible to visually impaired individuals.178 The court concluded the cost of
the upgrade did not matter even though the business had $250,000 budgeted,
because that amount “pales in comparison” to the $2 million Winn-Dixie
spent creating the website and the subsequent $7 million overhaul to accom-
modate the rewards program in 2016.179 The court also held it was feasible
service alleged and a physical place); see also Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 n.8
(noting that some courts require a nexus between the challenged service and the
public accommodation).
173. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target, Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953–55 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
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for Winn-Dixie to repair the site.180 Further, the court explained its view that
third parties are not an insurmountable obstacle, as they either already must
comply to meet the same ADA requirement or Winn-Dixie has a “legal obli-
gation” to require them to do so if they are part of site.181
The court ordered Winn-Dixie to conform its website with the WCAG
2.0 criteria and allow visually impaired consumers to enjoy full and equal
enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions provided.182 It is important to note the district court did not go as far as
it could have; the ruling did not declare the website a public accommodation
in itself, instead only holding it was heavily integrated enough into the full
enjoyment of a public accommodation’s goods and services.183 However, that
technicality can make this ruling more likely to be upheld, because the hold-
ing is not as significant of a departure on the application of Title III as other
courts that simply classified websites as places of public accommodation.
Winn-Dixie has appealed and filed its opening brief in October 2017.184 Gil
submitted the appellee’s brief late December 2017.185 Oral arguments have
been tentatively scheduled for May 2018.186
V. COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS &
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Analysis of Competing Interests
1. Economic Impact of ADA Claims and the Fear of Litigation
In the view of businesses, plaintiffs have been virtually unchecked in
raising web accessibility claims. Companies across the country fear receiving
demand letters from plaintiffs’ firms and disability rights advocacy groups
alleging the company is violating Title III of the ADA. The litigation in Gil
v. Winn-Dixie is an example of the concern. While he was depicted as a loyal
Winn-Dixie customer with few shopping alternatives, Gil has filed suit
against many other companies and has been winning and settling cases in
large volumes.187 Even the district courts’ written version of the facts cast Gil
in an unusually warm light, listing his volunteer activities, education, and
180. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1347.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1350.
183. Id. at 1348.
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participation in Para-Olympic events.188 Another notable achievement is that
Gil has filed nearly seventy lawsuits alleging that various companies’ web-
sites violate the ADA.189 Winn-Dixie was the third such lawsuit he filed.190 It
is probable this prolific plaintiff activity is what triggered the DOJ’s some-
what unexpected commentary in his case. An independent account showed
that, as of October 2017, Gil’s attorney had filed forty-three percent of the
244 federal website accessibility cases filed so far that year.191 Sean Gorecki,
the plaintiff that obtained a settlement in the McDonald’s case, is also a
plaintiff in dozens of similar lawsuits against companies including Chili’s
parent Brinker International, Quizno’s, Arby’s, T.G.I Friday’s, Red Lobster,
Sizzler, Supercuts, Bath & Body Works, and Build-a-Bear Workshop.192
In addition to the frequency of litigation, the cost of adjusting a website
to meet guidelines that do not exist presents another challenge for potential
defendants. As demonstrated in Gil, the lack of any standards defining com-
pliance means disagreement arises even when parties measure the approxi-
mate cost of retrofitting an existing website to be accessible.193 Target, for
example, had to pay approximately $10 million in damages and legal fees to
settle a class action lawsuit with the National Federation of the Blind in addi-
tion to its agreement to make its website accessible to customers with disabil-
ities.194 It is important to note that private entities must make their websites
compatible with assistive technologies of various kinds, not just those for
consumers with visual impairments. Making a website accessible to assistive
technology also requires very technical knowledge that seemingly exists be-
yond the traditional skillset of employees who are typically responsible for
running a website. For example, the Vice President of Information Technol-
ogy at Winn-Dixie was regarded as having the most knowledge on website
188. Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
189. John O’Brien, First-of-Its-Kind Trial Goes Plaintiff’s Way; Winn-Dixie Must
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digital applications, yet even he had little experience or awareness of the
depth of the work required to make Winn-Dixie’s website accessible.195
Due to both the cost of modifying a website to better comply with assis-
tive-reading technology and the uncertainty as to whether any steps taken
would satisfy a court’s interpretation of the law, private entities may be less
inclined to adopt technology that would help improve their services or opera-
tions if it could trigger an unforeseen ADA claim. The advent and expansion
of mobile applications as an alternative to traditional websites has only ex-
panded this uncertainty. Mobile applications or mobile-only services are
slowly becoming part of the types of entities in the crosshairs of web accessi-
bility suits.196 The ADA’s application to web content will only continue to
expand as services become more and more web-based.
2. The Social Impact of an ADA “Discrimination” Claim
The direct economic risks of an ADA website suit can be roughly esti-
mated, but less direct effects can take their toll on private entities subject to
Title III. First, by the language of the law, website accessibility lawsuits must
allege that “discrimination” under the ADA occurred in some manner.197
While the devastating impact of social stigmatization to people with disabili-
ties must always be at the forefront,198 policymakers must also acknowledge
the indirect impacts on local commerce. Companies that fail to design acces-
sibility into their web-based consumer platforms are exposed to a palpable
risk of reduced revenues, lost customers, and a damaged reputation.199
Businesses found guilty of “discriminating” against people with disabil-
ities face an uphill battle to redeem their public image. More than ever, con-
sumers actively make their purchasing decisions based on a business’ stance
or actions regarding prominent social issues.200 The impact of this problem
extends beyond traditional businesses and affects other “private” entities, in-
cluding schools and colleges.201 For example, if consumers actively make
purchasing decisions based the on social impact of traditional profit-oriented
195. See Gil, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
196. Brian Solomon, Shopping Apps Are Now the Fastest Growing Thing in Mobile,
FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/01/06/
shopping-apps-are-now-the-fastest-growing-thing-in-mobile.
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397, 437 (2000).
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businesses, then prospective students are likely to avoid schools alleged to
have discriminated against people with disabilities.
3. Rationale for the ADA
The ADA was signed into law in 1990 because Congress concluded that
individuals with disabilities commonly faced discrimination in modern soci-
ety.202 Congress found people with disabilities wound up leading socially and
economically disadvantaged lives, so it sought to extend civil rights protec-
tions seen in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
While the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prevented discrimination by public en-
tities such as government agencies, it did not restrict discrimination from
privately owned places of public accommodation, such as schools, restau-
rants, or hospitals. Even when originally designed, the architects of the ADA
acknowledged that law’s scope must extend beyond tangible barriers; con-
gressional hearings demonstrated that Congress sought to ensure people with
disabilities feel welcome and address their fears about participating safely in
places of public accommodation.203
However, common accessibility issues often arise for people with disa-
bilities when the Internet is involved. These issues can vary among individu-
als with disabilities depending on their impairment; issues regarding website
compatibility can render a website completely inaccessible to many kinds of
people with disabilities, not just those with visual impairments. While indi-
viduals with visual disabilities can rely on assistive technology to read web-
site content, websites must still possess underlying code instructing the
device on how to describe graphic content and navigate the page. Thus, if a
site owner takes no affirmative steps to make their website compatible, a
webpage is likely to become indecipherable to an individual relying on an
assistive technology. The rapid adoption of online content by both consumers
and businesses only increases the potential for accessibility hurdles. To rec-
tify these issues and establish their rights, individuals with disabilities began
to bring new lawsuits in court that specifically targeted websites as places of
public accommodation.204
The nature of the ADA is that of a remedial statute; it is not meant to
provide large monetary damages to harmed plaintiffs, only reasonable legal
fees and a court order requiring an entity to remedy the issue.205 However,
the confidential nature of most settlements does little to reveal any additional
costs required to settle an ADA accessibility claim out of court.
202. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 28 (1990), as re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310.
203. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 4 at 28.
204. See, e.g., Gomez v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1378 (S.D.
Fla. 2018); Walker v. Sam’s Oyster House, LLC, No. 18-193, 2018 WL
4466076, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a), 12205, 2000a–3(b).
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B. Alternatives & Solutions
As a result of the ongoing split in ADA interpretations, judicial agree-
ment will likely only be fostered if the Supreme Court decides to hear a case
on the matter. Otherwise, the judicial split will continue to exist. This under-
scores why cases such as Gil v. Winn-Dixie are so important—because they
offer eligible cases for the Supreme Court to review and attempt to settle the
matter. Nonetheless, this issue has been developing for years with no sign
that the Court plans to address it soon. In reviewing Gil on appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit will likely follow its own precedent set in Rendon, which
adopted the use of the nexus test for ADA claims.206 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit is reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a website accessibility suit
against pizza giant Domino’s.207 If the court upholds the dismissal as antici-
pated, it may result in a large reduction of website accessibility claims in
federal courts bound by Ninth Circuit.208 Even if the number of such claims
decrease in the Ninth Circuit, there is no reason to believe the ongoing surge
of website accessibility lawsuits will slow down in other jurisdictions.209
1. DOJ Issuing Regulations or Guidance
While the DOJ had maintained a posture indicating support for ex-
panding Title III to include websites, the most recent news has represented an
about-face.210 Though the DOJ left the door open for taking further action if
necessary, it made no commitments and has not provided any further time-
lines. Unfortunately, DOJ guidance would likely provide the most effective
remedy, because it would fill in the gaps of the ADA and offer clearer guide-
lines for compliance. Even if the DOJ intended to address the problem, any
action would not generate immediate results. Though the DOJ could immedi-
ately issue commentary on the proper application of Title III, courts would
only look to it as a guideline, not as steadfast regulation. The DOJ could
begin anew the rule making process to issue regulations, but that process is
time-intensive and any lasting regulations could take years. From issuing an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 2010, it took the DOJ six years
just to announce it would postpone any rulemaking to 2018, before the cur-
rent administration reversed course and announced no new rules would be
206. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).
207. Vu & Ryan, supra note 7.
208. Vu & Ryan, supra note 7.
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issued.211 Thus, the likelihood of intervention by the DOJ is low and progress
could be years away.
2. Congressional Revision of the ADA
While the Internet existed in 1990, it was nowhere near as prevalent as
it is today.212 At the time, Congress did not address the effects of the ADA on
the Internet, and even the statute’s definition of public accommodation does
not specifically refer to the Internet. Congress was successful in revising the
ADA in 2008, when Congress amended the law to better define protected
disabilities.213 Congress took this action specifically because it determined
courts were misinterpreting the ADA and defining the meaning of a disability
far too narrowly.214 Congress even called attention to specific cases in which
it felt the courts strayed too far from the ADA.215 However, none of the 2008
ADA amendments made any mention of web content, leaving the judiciary
with the task of interpreting the existing law. The current state of political
dysfunction does not indicate an optimistic likelihood that Congress can suc-
cessfully pass amendments to the ADA on any topic, let alone on website
accessibility.
In addition, any local- or state-level regulation will not help resolve this
federal law issue. The ADA does not preempt any other law, whether federal,
state, or local, as long as the other law grants protections equal to or greater
than those provided by the ADA.216 However, setting up clear guidelines
(that by definition must be as stringent as the ADA) is a difficult task for
lawmakers. Due to the vague nature of this law—that does not mention the
Internet but is applied to websites—it is unclear as to what an equivalent
level of local regulation would be. Additionally, even if local or state legisla-
tures take up the issue and provide greater protections than those granted in
the ADA, the results may only serve to upset private entities within that
jurisdiction. Any company in a local or state jurisdiction that enacts its own
website compliance laws with greater protections will find themselves forced
211. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information
and Services of Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460 (proposed July
26, 2010); Robert, supra note 6.
212. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, supra note 60.
213. Congress intended for the term “disability” under the ADA to be interpreted
similarly to how it was interpreted under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Policy Brief Series: Righting the Americans with Disabilities Act, NAT’L COUN-
CIL ON DISABILITY (Oct. 21, 2003), https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/Oct21
2003.
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to adhere to a local law (with higher standards than the ADA) which does not
guarantee any protection from federal ADA claims.217
3. Self-Adhering to Accessibility Standards
As more and more private entities begin to expand their services
through web or mobile-based technologies that are accessible from any place
with interment access, they expose themselves to potential ADA liability.
Because an ADA suit could be brought in various federal jurisdictions (even
simultaneously and often with differing interpretations of the law), private
entities must operate as if their websites are places of public accommodation.
Otherwise, the risk of liability could be too great. The best way to prevent a
website accessibility lawsuit or increase the chances of its dismissal is to take
affirmative steps in makings one’s own website compatible with accessibility
technology.
In the absence of any codified standards, self-adhering to the WCAG
2.0 may be the best way to demonstrate that a website is accessible. The
WCAG 2.0 provides the most reliable standards for website accessibility
conformance because it is the most prominent set of accessibility standards
and has been embraced by courts, such as in Gil v. Winn-Dixie.218 In addition,
the DOJ has acknowledged the WCAG 2.0 as a benchmark and even used it
in website accessibility proceedings.219 By conforming to the WCAG 2.0,
website operators can avoid liability by preventing compatibility issues from
ever arising for customers. Further, showing conformance to WCAG 2.0 can
help an entity under Title III demonstrate it has made its website as accessi-
ble as necessary under the ADA.
Beyond the prevention of litigation, embracing website accessibility re-
form is in the best interest of businesses. It improves the customer experience
for a legally-protected segment of the population and prevents negative pub-
licity due to accessibility barriers. A website accessible to more people inher-
ently increases the pool of potential customers able to interact with the site,
thus increasing potential exposure or revenue. One recent decision from late
2017 suggested an accessible website “banner” providing a staffed telephone
number to address accessibility issues could be a means of compliance in lieu
of a fully accessible website.220 The court reasoned that if a defendant can
show telephonic access provides equal access, no violation of the ADA oc-
217. See id.
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curred.221 Of course, as discussed in Part III, compliance in one jurisdiction
does not guarantee compliance in others.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA, as it exists, does not serve the interests of parties on either
side. Current interpretation of the vague language of the ADA leaves incon-
sistent and unreliable protections for individuals with disabilities. Congress
intended for the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable stan-
dards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”222 Un-
fortunately, little is consistent or clear regarding the opposing outcomes in
the Netflix cases, for example.223 The precise scenario noted in the dissent of
Parker224 has slowly become reality: as establishments continue to integrate
their services online, the protections offered by Title III of the ADA continue
to be diluted. Even legal compromises such as the nexus test do not help
because they still require a court to establish a somewhat dubious connection
between an alleged discrimination claim and a physical place of public
accommodation.225
If the unpredictable state of ADA website law leaves business vulnera-
ble, then those intended to be protected by the law suffer just as much, be-
cause it would essentially require a legal background just to determine the
obscure extent of one’s own rights in a particular jurisdiction. Advocates
may argue that the ADA is working as intended, because it is getting results
for plaintiffs that experience discrimination, albeit in an incongruous manner.
This argument claims that the ADA is working as intended in deterring enti-
ties from maintaining inaccessible websites because the net effect achieves
some level of change by causing business to make their websites accessible.
However, causing businesses to modify their services and be accessible to
individuals with disabilities out of fear of litigation is an alarmingly ineffi-
cient process delivering, at best, inconsistent results. Just as the court in Ac-
cess Now warned, the judicial expansion of the ADA’s reach to include non-
physical spaces “create[s] new rights without well-defined standards.”226
Entities that could fall under Title III are left with no instructions on
how to demonstrate they comply with the ADA. Simply put, these entities
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cannot follow rules that do not exist. While the DOJ has abandoned the cause
to salvage the situation and fails to provide leadership on the issue,227 courts
continue to conjure their own brands of justice in applying the ADA. While
the DOJ is not likely to push the previous administration’s pro-website acces-
sibility agenda, its inaction will not stop more lawsuits. Though an amend-
ment to the ADA could curb excessive lawsuits, an amendment is highly
unlikely.228 Congress has made significant revisions only once in the twenty-
eight years since the law was enacted. Surprisingly, the ADA still does not
mention the Internet. As the court in Domino’s ruled, finding a private en-
tity’s website liable for discrimination would violate its due process rights
because the DOJ has not yet promulgated new regulations on website acces-
sibility.229 Thus, the best risk mitigation effort for any potential Title III enti-
ties is still to make their websites accessible as soon as possible.
The fact remains that the current state of the ADA does not adequately
serve both those that the statute is enforced upon and those it was intended to
protect. Even companies wishing to fully comply with the law have no cer-
tain way to do so, because the lack of any regulations leaves the creation of
accessibility standards to a district court judge. The net effect leads busi-
nesses nowhere in addressing the problem without lawsuits and leaves plain-
tiffs hoping that they sued in the right jurisdiction.
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